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THE BCE DECISION: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRM AS 
A CONTRACTUAL ORGANIZATION 
 
Peer Zumbansen* and Simon Archer** 
 
I. THE SCC DECISION AND THE BCE DEAL 
 
On June 20th, 2008 the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) over-turned the 
Quebec Court of Appeal (QCA)1 holding that the plan of arrangement 
taking BCE Inc. (BCE) private did not improperly neglect a subsidiary’s 
(Bell Canada) bondholders’ interests. The heavily leveraged ($30B) buy-
out of shareholders claims ($51.7B) will proceed next December, if all 
goes well. That’s a big deal. 
 
The decision was widely applauded if not expected in corporate law firms 
and boardrooms.2 The Court in Ottawa has not yet released reasons, and 
may not until the autumn. It is and will be one of the most discussed 
corporate law decisions since the SCC’s Peoples v. Wise3 decision of 
2004, which will almost certainly be revisited and, we expect, 
distinguished.  
 
There are so many interesting facets of the BCE deal, but most of the 
commentary before and after the BCE decision has focused on the 
                                                 
* Canada Research Chair, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. Email: 
Pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca 
 
** CLPE Fellow, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. Email: sarcher@osgoode.yorku.ca. 
1 [2008] Q.C.C.A. 935. There are no reasons released for the SCC decision at the time of 
writing. 
2 DeCloet, D., “A Victory for sanity, capitalism and common sense”, Globe and Mail, 
June 21, 2008, available online at 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20080621.RDECLOET21/TPStory/
TPBusiness/?query= (last visited June 30, 2008). 
3 Peoples’ Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 [hereinafter 
Wise]; available online at 
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importance of “shareholder primacy” in certain transactions and the role of 
contract law in delimiting bondholders’ rights. The main thrust of the 
commentary is that shareholder wealth maximization should be the 
standard which boards meet in these types of takeover transactions. 
Bondholders can contract the terms they need, so if things don’t go right, 
caveat emptor. At times, these two features are said to be essential to the 
functioning and even existence of free market capitalism.4 That burdens 
the case with more weight than is warranted. It does, though, indicate that 
the SCC must delve even deeper into an area it has largely managed to 
avoid. 
 
The SCC’s relatively rare interjection into the heart of corporate law — 
where angels fear to tread — is the more remarkable as corporate law has 
become one if not the most intensively contested regulatory areas. Once 
thought of as a relatively sleepy and uneventful domain, corporate law has 
become a focus of new tensions. As corporate activities increasingly 
globalize under the pressure of knowledge, production and distribution 
flows, their regard to national boundaries5 becomes less and less. 
Technological change and industrial composition change rapidly, 
processes even more exacerbated by the crucial impact of what is 
sometimes termed the “financialization” of capitalism.6 
 
The BCE deal is in many ways a product of these factors, but we have not 
heard quite as much about them in the legal commentary to date. It is 
worth mentioning some of them before we turn to more narrowly 
constructed legal issues before the Court. 
 
                                                 
4 MacIntosh, J., “The People’s corporate law, unsafe at any speed”, Financial Post, June 
10, 2008 available online at 
http://www.law.utoronto.ca/visitors_content.asp?itemPath=5/5/0/0/0&contentId=1752 
(last visited June 30, 2008). 
5 See only LYNN, B. C., END OF THE LINE. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GLOBAL 
CORPORATION (Doubleday: New York 2005); hereto Kennedy-Stewart, F. in (2007) 8 
GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 1091, available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol08No11/PDF_Vol_08_No_11_1091-
1108_Developments_Kennedy-Stewart.pdf 
6 Foster, J., “The Financialization of Capitalism” in (2007) 58:1 Monthly Review 
available online at http://www.monthlyreview.org/0407jbf.htm (last visited June 30, 
2008). 




II. THE DEAL IN WIDER CONTEXT 
BCE7 itself is a former regulated monopoly in a now deregulated 
telecommunications industry that has seen very dynamic economic change 
in the past 10 years. BCE provides communication services to residential 
and business customers in Canada. Its services include landline and 
wireless phone services, internet and broadband services, information and 
communications technology services, and satellite and VDSL television 
services. 
The BCE deal is the largest-ever leveraged buy-out (LBO) in Canadian 
history: that is, the financing of the deal is largely from borrowed money 
secured against the business. The purchasers are a consortium of a private 
equity firm (Cerberus) and a pension fund (Ontario Teacher’s Pension 
Plan). The original deal documents can be found on the July 5, 2007 
SEDAR filings, and summarized in the August 14, 2007 circular to 
shareholders and a summary of the deal structure is available.8 
 
The LBO takeover technique was made infamous during the 1980s, 
especially in the context of hostile takeovers — you may remember 
Michael Milken funding corporate raiders with high-yield bonds. In fact, it 
was in just one of those takeovers, the Ronald Perelman takeover of 
Revlon Inc., that the shareholder primacy argument in the U.S. was tested. 
The case9 was seminal in re-establishing the directors’ duty to maximize 
shareholder wealth in a hostile take-over transaction. It became known 
colloquially as the “Revlon rule”. That rule has since been re-interpreted 
in U.S. jurisprudence to accommodate other circumstances and types of 
transactions. But, rather than being a self-evident truth since Henry Ford’s 
day, adopting a policy of shareholder wealth maximization has been 
occasionally challenged and required intervention from courts to 
                                                 
7 See basic corporate information at Globeinvestor, available online at 
http://www.globeinvestor.com/servlet/Page/document/v5/data/stock?id=BCE-
T&pi_sponsor= (last visited June 30, 2008). 
8 Both available online: see www.seadar.ca and see 
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/Broadcast/eng/HEARINGS/2007/ex2007-19.htm for the deal 
structure (last visited June 30, 2008). 
9 Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding Inc. (1986) 506 A.2d 173, Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. P 92,525, 54 USLW 2483, 66 A.L.R.4th 157. 
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determine appropriate circumstances for the application of that duty: we’ll 
say something more about this below. 
 
That LBO era also saw the erosion of corporate bond ratings as debt was 
piled on to finance transactions, the circumstances surrounding the issue 
before the courts here. This prior LBO experience is in fact what the 
appellants point to when they argue that Bell Canada’s bondholders knew 
or should have known the risks they were taking. Since that first big LBO 
era, many of those same corporate raiders (who avoided jail time) had two 
decades to acclimatize to the role of proprietors. This time, the BCE deal 
was a friendly take-over by a respected private equity firm (they also have 
a stake in Chrysler, for example) and an equally respected pension fund, 
and was made with the approval of board and management, after 
considering competing bids. 
 
However, as in the old LBO era, the deal raises questions of how the debt 
will be paid, what strains it will put on business finances and whether it 
will be paid at the expense of future re-investment in the firm, product 
development, R&D, improving existing infrastructure, or cuts in other 
areas: in other words, at the expense of other stakeholders in the 
corporation. In the past, wages and pensions were top of the list, although 
one suspects those would be sensitive issues for a majority owner that 
itself is a pension fund. To date, however, there is not a clearly stated new 
business direction for the privatized corporation. There are also no clear 
indications of the exit strategy for the BCE deal, if there is one.  
 
In this particular type of takeover and other M&As, the intentions and 
consequences are sometimes characterized as long-term versus short-term. 
Pension funds are often thought to be long-term investors (although 
evidence of equity market holdings in the 1990s suggests not always) and 
private equity houses are thought to be short-term investors (which is 
where they earned their reputation as “raiders”). It is unclear if one or all 
of the BCE buyers are in it for the long haul, but we might assume they 
are.  
 
These two approaches are associated with various metrics by which we 
can test theories of the overall value of the deal or of types of transactions 
in general. It is still too soon to tell, and as with so many aspects of 
markets, we will only know in retrospect. Empirical evidence and other 




academic work have not discerned a clear trend in the longer-term 
outcomes of this recent spate of privatizations.10 Related research on 
M&As is inconclusive at best: as measured by share prices, M&As have 
not always or consistently been value propositions for purchasers and their 
stakeholders, especially in the telecom sector.11 However, we can say that 
one of the useful developments in this research is to examine a broader 
array of business-related measurements such as employment tenure and 
wages, investment, R&D as well as the more traditional financial tests of a 
healthy organization. It will no doubt take a business cycle to test the 
financial architecture of these deals, if the current credit crunch does not 
do the job. 
 
Or an exit strategy might involve a short-term sale of the ownership 
interest to a foreign transnational telecom or conglomerate. There are 
currently limitations on the foreign ownership of telecoms in Canada, 
although a recent report12 produced for the federal government has 
recommended repealing those restrictions. In that case, we could see yet 
another Canadian corporation “hollowed out”13, with its major decision-
making functions moved offshore. This hollowing out is the head office 
equivalent of manufacturing jobs sent offshore, but this time, it affects 
senior management and the producer services that go along with senior 
management: accounting, legal and financial services in particular. Again, 
                                                 
10 Bratton, W. W., “Hedge Funds and Governance Targets” (2006) Georgetown Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 928689 Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=928689 (last visited June 30, 2008). 
11 For examples of this research see Capasso, A.& O. Meglio, “The Evolving Role of 
Mergers and Acquisitions in Competitive Strategy Research” (September 20, 2007) 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015722; Wright, M., Siegel, D. & D. 
Cumming,"Private Equity, Leveraged Buyouts and Governance" (2007) Journal of 
Corporate Finance available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=983802; Bouwman, C.H., 
Fuller, K. & A. Nain, “Market valuation and acquisition quality: Empirical evidence” 
(2006) Review of Financial Studies available online: 
http://web.management.mcgill.ca/Amrita.Nain/index_files/RFSforth.pdf; (last visited 
June 30, 2008). 
12 Competition Policy Review Panel, Compete to Win, Report of the Competition Policy 
Review Panel, June, 2008 available online at http://www.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/cprp-
gepmc.nsf/en/Home, (last visited June 30, 2008). 
13 Arthurs, H.W., “The Hollowing Out of Corporate Canada?” available online 
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there is debate14 about the short and long-term effects of hollowing out, 
and time (and better empirical work) will tell.  
 
We can perceive, though, a parallel here, as the more corporate 
governance and organizational design become increasingly driven by 
financial design and transnational strategy, the more corporate law’s 
traditional regulatory framework is increasingly put under enormous 
pressure. After several years of intensive, comparative study of national 
regulatory responses to an ever-more de-territorialized15 corporate reality, 
the particular, transnational nature of corporate governance regulation16 - 
as a field populated by a mix of public and private, domestic and supra-
national norm-entrepreneurs - has become more and more apparent. These 
background tensions are, or will be, essential to contextualizing the 
operation of corporations on a daily and practical basis. 
 
III. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OR CAVEAT 
EMPTOR? 
 
It may seem odd to recite a series of academic and policy concerns in a 
commentary about a bondholder dispute with an LBO. The connection 
will be made presently; but next we turn to the issue that seemed to 
awaken the corporate legal community from its dogmatic slumber. This 
was the decision of the QCA to refuse to approve the plan of arrangement, 
against all expectations. 
 
The core conflict in this decision is between the economic interests of 
BCE shareholders on one side and the of the BCE debt-holders on the 
other. The issues before the court were of course narrowly framed — they 
                                                 
14 Hynes, D., Restructuring in a Global Economy: Is Corporate Canada Being Hollowed-
out? Report for the Conference Board of Canada, June, 2001 available online at 
http://www.conferenceboard.ca/documents.asp?rnext=71 (last visited June 30, 2008). 
15 Hill, J.G., “The Persistent Debate about Convergence in Comparative Corporate 
Governance”  Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 06/3 Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=881896. 
16 Zumbansen, P. “The Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance and Labor Law” (May 
16, 2006) CLPE Research Paper No. 6/2006 Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=902650. 




were not asked a policy question but a question of legal interpretation — 
and so naturally discussion reflects this construction. We don’t have the 
SCC’s reasons yet, only its decision, but we can discuss the issues with 
reference to the decision of the QCA and the 2004 Wise decision, which is 
considered by some to be the real cause for concern.17 
 
At the core of the QCA’s reasoning is the finding that BCE’s board did not 
give sufficient regard to the interests of the bondholders in structuring the 
transaction, that is, whether it could have achieved the privatization 
without such a significant erosion of existing bonds’ value. The QCA 
criticized the proposed plan of arrangement for its failure to be “fair and 
reasonable” to all security-holders in the circumstances.  
 
The legal basis for this criticism was a provision in the Canada Business 
Corporations Act (CBCA).18 It contains a duty under which directors must 
consider the interests of all security-holders in approving a plan of 
arrangement. Bondholders are security-holders by definition, and they 
therefore sought relief under the oppression remedy, which addresses 
unfair and unreasonable treatment of corporate constituencies and is 
recognized in s. 241 of the CBCA.  
 
BCE’s procedure by plan of arrangement required that it establish that the 
plan was “fair and reasonable” within the meaning of s. 192 of the CBCA. 
A plan of arrangement is a technique for achieving a takeover deal in one 
step, commonly used in friendly takeovers. It is also used in other re-
organizations of corporations, sometimes in the context of insolvencies. 
The Wise decision was one that involved one of these different contexts — 
an insolvency. The upshot of that decision was that directors should 
consider the interests of creditor stakeholders of a corporation: at least, 
they must in the context of a restructuring in the realm of insolvency. The 
Wise case provided support for the bondholders’ arguments in the BCE 
appeal. There are other distinctions between the two cases: strictly 
                                                 
17 Lee, I.B., “Peoples Department Stores v. Wise and the 'Best Interests of the 
Corporation'” (2005) 41  
Canadian Business Law Journal 212; see also Rousseau S. & P. Desalliers, in their new 
book ’Les devoirs des administrateurs lors d'une prise de contrôle, étude comparative du 
droit du Delaware et du droit canadien’, which the Appeals Court quotes extensively at 
paras. [100] ff., for an ongoing interpretation of the Wise judgment. 
18 R.S.C. 1985 c. C-44. 
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speaking, the subsidiary was not “in play” in the BCE deal, its parent was. 
Wise involved a private corporation, not a public one like BCE.  
 
Many of these differences were not mooted by the QCA. In the central 
passage of its decision, the QCA engages on several fronts with the very 
theory of corporate law, which critics19 readily mobilize in their rejection20 
of the Court’s judgment. Within the statutory framework we have just 
described, the issue was framed by the QCA as an interpretation of the 
contractual terms governing the debentures. By employing this 
framework, the QCA sets itself the challenge of providing a contextual 
contractual interpretation: in other words, of enforcing the terms of the 
parties’ contract both with regard to the terms themselves, in light of the 
circumstances in which the contracts were concluded, and the effect of the 
BCE transaction upon them. In a nutshell, the QCA held that, 
 
reasonable expectations are not limited to the legal rights spelled out in the 
contractual terms of the trust indentures. However, these expectations, to remain 
reasonable, cannot run contrary to the express terms of the relevant contracts 
[emphasis added].21 
 
In this short passage, we find the essence of what makes contract law the 
enormous enigma22 in legal science and practice. The reliance on the 
parties’ intentions is unavoidably always an ambitious act of intervention, 
whatever the interpreter’s intention.23 Trying to get the contract’s terms 
right between an interpretation of the contract’s terms, but not against 
what the contract’s terms constitutes, is the very challenge that any legal 
enforcement of contractual arrangements entails. 
 
                                                 
19 Backer, L.C., "Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nation's 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as Harbinger of Corporate 
Responsibility in International Law" (2005) 37 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=695641. See also Backer’s commentary here: 
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2008/05/fiduciary-duty-for-directors-in-canada.html 
(last visited June 30, 2008). 
20 Macinstosh, supra note 4. 
21 [2008] Q.C.C.A. 935 at para. 71. 
22 Zumbansen, P., "The Law of Society: Governance Through Contract" CLPE Research 
Paper 2/2007 available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=988610. 
23 Fuller, L. 'Consideration and Form', (1941) 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799-824. 




A formal and — as we argue below — reductionist view would restrict 
any interpretation to the written terms of the contract. In this view, 
reasonable expectations are limited to those spelled out in the contractual 
terms, as was urged by the appellants. This view of contracts, as bilateral 
negotiations that meet a set of legal formalities at a fixed point in time has 
its advantages, and the concept itself can be expanded through 
multiplication to accommodate the myriad transactions of a corporation. 
 
Or, a wider view might involve an assessment of director’s duties (the 
statutory duties to security-holders, or the duty to be “fair and reasonable”) 
or even what took place over the course of a business relationship (what 
the directors said to the bondholders or other stakeholders in the firm in 
press releases, but did not reduce to contract). The challenge of contractual 
interpretation is thereby amplified by the organizational context in which 
the interpretation takes place.  
 
IV. THE CORPORATION AS A CASCADE OF 
CONTRACTS 
 
Once we have come this far, we can artificially divide the world into two 
groups: those who want to look at the contract, the text, and those who 
want to look at the circumstances around the contract, the unstated 
expectations or conditions, the changes since the contract, and so-on: in 
short, the context. Contractual theory and practice can accomplish both, 
but before turning to those developments, we ought consider the 
implication of examining contracts in corporate structures and corporate 
structures as contracts both in the narrow sense. 
 
Commentators such as Professor MacIntosh rejected the QCA (and Wise) 
decision, recognizing in the QCA’s approach nothing but a 
misunderstanding of the “true” theory of the firm. The firm, he and they 
suggest, is much more like a “nexus of contracts”, within which the 
bondholders are themselves one type of contractor. In the corporate nexus, 
there are two main kinds of contracting parties: the “fixed claimants”, who 
specifically negotiate the terms of each contract they have with others in 
the firm, and the “residual claimants” who do not negotiate each term, but 
rely upon a standard statutory structure to define their rights and 
 
 
10                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 04 
 
obligations. (True believers assert that the CBCA itself is only a set of 
default rules representing implied contracts that otherwise would have 
been negotiated, but for the lack of time, money and convenience. Those 
conditions may, of course, be the limits to contract theory that justify 
intervention.) 
 
The advantage of the nexus theory, to be sure, is great clarity and 
conceptual simplicity if not elegance: it allows for an assessment of the 
“negotiated” and at least stipulated written rights and duties of those 
involved in the contractual arrangement. If it meets the proper formalities, 
the contract becomes part of the ascertainable legal architecture of the 
firm. They become a series of “atomistic” transactions. Expanding the 
concept, some groups of contracts form a nexus, which is a firm, and ever-
larger groups of contracts become a market. Contracts are on the whole 
exchanges for value, these values form prices, which provide an essential 
feed-back mechanism to the self-regulation of contracts, firms and markets 
through the (re)negotiation of still more contracts over time.  
 
A contractual theory of the firm sees directors and senior management as 
agents of and subordinate to shareholders, which, because of the 
opportunity for conflicts of interest (self-dealing using the property of 
another), requires the imposition of a statutory duty to act in the interests 
of shareholder. (Presumably, such terms would have been negotiated 
anyway, but for time and convenience, and equality, we might presume, 
equities sell at a significant premium to their nearest substitutes as a result 
of the inclusion of this protection.) By protecting the interests of 
shareholders, the residual claimants — it is said — the firm’s value as a 
whole is maximized as often as possible. Although not perfect, as the 
bondholders no doubt feel, some say it is the least worst option as a form 
of ordering corporate affairs. 
 
There are complexities and challenges to this model. There are internecine 
debates about whether firms are all contracts or only partly contracts and 
partly “defensive partitions”, and there are debates about the delineation of 
firms from markets and their operation within them. On the whole, 
however, it is maintained that these contracts are informed by an economic 
logic, and their enforcement should follow the dictates of that logic. There 




has been so much erudite commentary24 on the theory of the corporation 
as a nexus of contracts, that it needs little effort here to recognize the force 
and persuasiveness of this approach.  
 
And yet, this is also a reductionist view of the corporation as its 
mobilization generally reduces the (potentially vast) scope of possible 
influences on decision-making in corporate relations to the terms of the 
written documents. The critique of the nexus theory has long been 
established.25 The nexus theory does not seem to explain some firm 
behaviours26, and academic work has explored the influence of other 
“extra-legal” norms, such as the influence of hierarchical non-contractual 
relations on intra-firm behaviours. Others27 suggest that while there may 
be contracts, they may not operate to form markets: is there, for instance, a 
functioning market in management, or not? Sometimes, the critique is 
framed as one challenging28 shareholder primacy on the basis that 
functionally, a corporation does not operate in the way its legal 
infrastructure suggests. Even those (formerly) committed to the 
shareholder primacy and shareholder maximization doctrines have 
reviewed the effects of recent history – a period loosely associated with 
triumph of this concept -- and suggested that a broader analysis is 
required.29 
                                                 
24 Easterbrook, F.H. & D. R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 
(Harvard University Press, 1991).  
25 Bratton, W.W. 'The 'Nexus of Contracts' Corporation: A Critical Appraisal', (1989) 74 
Cornell L. Rev. 407-465; Bratton, W.W. 'The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual 
Corporation', (1992) 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 180-215; Deakin, S. 'Squaring the Circle? 
Shareholder Value and Corporate Social Responsibility in the U.K.' (2002) 70 George 
Washington Law Review 976-987. 
26 Ben-Ishai, S., A Team Production Model of Canadian Corporate Law, available online 
at http://www.comparativeresearch.net/servlet/DownloadPDF?paperid=100000035 (last 
visited June 30, 2008). 
27 Hill, J.G., "Public Beginnings, Private Ends - Should Corporate Law Privilege the 
Interests of Shareholders?" INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE LAW, MacMillan, ed., Hart 
Publishing, p. 17, 2000 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=885222 
28 Hutchinson, A., “Why Shareholder Primacy”, Globe and Mail, June 11, 2008 available 
online at 
http://osgoode.yorku.ca/media2.nsf/83303ffe5af03ed585256ae6005379c9/4cc1efab41d04
1ca8525746600509ef0!OpenDocument (Last visited June 30, 2008). 
29 Jensen, Michael C., "Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate 
Objective Function" (October 2001). Unfolding Stakeholder Thinking, eds. J. Andriof, et 
al, (Greenleaf Publishing, 2002). Also published in JACF, V. 14, N. 3, 2001, European 
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Some argue that shareholders are the real risk-takers in a corporate nexus, 
and as such, they are the engines of innovation, growth and capitalism. 
These conditions may be true for small start-ups and venture capitalists 
who seek to bring something new to the market but they’re not true for 
venerable blue-chip telecom giants like BCE. Shares of BCE are 
functionally much more like other claims on revenues of the corporation: 
they may pay dividends and they may appreciate when traded on the 
secondary market, they may be bought speculatively on the chance of the 
convergence of media technologies or the chance of an LBO at a premium 
of 40% to its pre-transaction price. But evidence suggests that equities are, 
in fact, a far less important source of risk capital for most corporations 
than retained earnings, loans from banks and bondholders, in that order. 
For this reason, the argument that permitting security-holders to use the 
oppression remedy raises the cost of capital should be taken with a grain 
of salt. And, for our purposes, whatever the economics, we observe that 
shares in a (widely-held, established) corporation are a very special form 
of contract distant from the liberal ideal, if they are a contract at all. 
 
Perhaps it is fair to say that the continuation of the shareholder primacy 
debate reflects the merits of arguments on either side. For now, the QCA’s 
treatment of the bondholders’ interests in the LBO lies at the centre of the 
continuing debate about the form by which interests and competences, 
rights and entitlements are allocated within the corporation.  What we 
propose to add to this wider discussion and specifically the commentary 
on the QCA decision is, in taking seriously the idea of the corporation as a 
nexus of contracts, to bring more of the history and development of 
contract theory into play. Our contention is that an expanded approach to 
contractual theory and design would contribute to a more convincing 
contractual concept of the corporation, if that is to be ultimately a 
workable theory of corporate forms.  
 
 
                                                                                                                         
Financial Management Review, N. 7, 2001 and in Breaking the Code of Change, M. Beer 
and N. Norhia, eds, HBS Press, 2000. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=220671 or 
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.220671 




V. A BRIEF HERMENEUTIC OF CONTRACT THEORY 
 
Through the lens of contract the corporation becomes the testing site for 
the core liberal principle of negotiated autonomy within a complex, 
dynamic organizational structure. The contentions of negotiated rights 
inside the firm, however, stress the contractual design to its limits by 
pushing the principle of “negotiation” into a multifaceted realm, where 
rights are constituted by parties within a regulatory framework through 
which the very rights the parties carry out are created and structured (e.g., 
that overrides freedom of contract by imposing terms), and by the 
importance of extra-, sub- or non-legal norms on contractual relations (e.g. 
that supplements or renders ineffective freedom of contract by filling gaps 
or influencing behaviour of the counter-parties). It is within these 
regulatory and legally pluralist frameworks that we would begin to 
examine contracts that constitute the firm. 
 
By seeking to understand and explain the corporation through contracts 
simpliciter, we tend to homogenize relations through attempts to identify 
conceptual similarities and by discounting anomalies. Further, we 
homogenize according to the protocols of the concepts we have selected to 
deploy. Starting with (say) the proposition that all rights within the 
corporation are negotiated, the consequence is that the scope and content 
of these contracts can be found within the written evidence of negotiation 
alone, instead of through a constructive interpretation of these 
arrangements within new or changing contexts in which they unfold. This 
renders a clear picture of contracts within the corporation, but not the 
reality of the contractual conditions or more broadly the actual operation 
of the firm. In fact, this idealization and homogenization operates to 
obscure or de-emphasize the framework around the contract and within 
which it is negotiated and gets us farther away from a working legal theory 
of the firm.  This “invisibilization” and homogeneisation might continue in 
an analysis of contracts in the corporation until the contractualized 
corporation (or theory of it) cannot distinguish between different types of 
contracts, and we get something like a “cascade of contracts”.  
 
We may even begin to believe that everything within the corporation is 
“negotiated” by idealized contracting parties and that, vice versa, they are 
all alike, merely “counter-parties”. Of course, they are not. Not all 
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contracting parties are equally potent and autonomous. Not all contracts 
are alike, not all are negotiated (including, for the most part, shareholder’s 
contracts) and of course not all contracts entail the same rights and duties, 
or have the same force on behaviour, or power, even at a very general 
conceptual level. We have long known30 that not all contracting parties 
engage in the bargaining process with the same pedigree of expertise and 
freedom from coercion.31 
 
There are even deeper implications of the thesis that all rights against the 
corporation and, vice versa, the directors’ responsibilities, are negotiated - 
in particular in the case of sophisticated contract partners as in the case of 
the BCE debentureholders. This implication is the concept of complete 
contracting, which follows from the contention of any free-standing 
principle of freedom of contract. It implies that all which happens within 
the corporation, in other words that a wide realm of interests, is 
exclusively governed by contract and, as we have just said, by free and 
sovereign private actors. Further, we impute to the actors significant 
power and knowledge, particularly of the future: they must have intended 
not to include certain terms. This seems to stretch the concept too far. We 
can readily see shortcomings and omissions in the contracting parties’ 
arrangements. We can assume where possible without court intervention, 
such gaps are filled.32 We will return to these quiddities presently. 
 
Many if not most would acknowledge these basic conditions limiting the 
liberal ideal we have of contracting. For example, MacIntosh in his 
discussion of the QCA decision — and we do not mean to overburden his 
remarks, merely to cite them as exemplary — distinguishes employee 
contracts from bondholder contracts, and acknowledges that the employee 
contracts require a statutory architecture to ensure they are fair. 
                                                 
30 Cohen, M., “The Basis for Contract” (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553. 
31 Dewey, J. 'The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality', (1926) 35 Yale L. 
J. 655-673; Hale, R.L., “Coercion and Distribution in a supposedly Non-cocercise State”, 
(1923) 38:3 Political Science Quarterly 470; Ireland, P. 'Recontractualising the 
Corporation: Implicit Contract as Ideology', in D. Campbell, H. Collins and J. Wightman 
(eds.), Implicit Dimensions of Contract (Hart Publishing, 2003). 
32 Bratton, W. W. &  J. McCahery "Incomplete Contracts Theories of the Firm and 
Comparative Corporate Governance," (2001) 2:2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law Article 7.  
available at: http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol2/iss2/art7 (last visited June 30, 
2008). 




Reasonable people disagree about the specific design of labour and 
employment standards law, but few dispute its importance in correcting 
failures inherent in a purely “contractual” conception of employment 
relations.  
 
Similarly, shareholders have very curious “contracts” with the other 
stakeholders in the corporation. They do not negotiate their terms for the 
most part and they are subject to statutory default rules that allocate risks. 
Shareholders are sometimes considered “owners” and in a sense “decision-
makers” in very limited ways, but there are libraries of conceptual, 
analytical and empirical reasons why this is not true in most public or 
widely-held corporations. They do have a claim to the “residual” assets of 
the corporation upon wind-up, but that very likely is not the primary 
motivation behind share purchases and is a very distant form of ownership 
to most, as we have discussed above in relation to the doctrine of 
shareholder primacy. 
 
But the homogenization that occurs in conceptualizing the corporation as a 
contract or cascade of them is an intellectually attractive process; 
abstracting from large pools of erratic inputs, selecting and making 
consistent some operational terms, compiling these almost monadic units 
into a comparative and systematic analysis. We know that it is difficult to 
idealize contractual relations in the way the theory demands without de-
contextualizing or “dis-embedding” them from the frameworks we 
described.  
 
This difficulty leads to analytical tensions in the attempt to articulate 
models of contractual and firm behaviour that conform to broad evidence, 
or, in a more continental vein, to adequately describe the operation of legal 
systems in or around other social systems. The tension comes between 
selecting and idealizing some form of transaction, some unit of analysis, 
and the reconciliation of that process with the myriad possible influences 
on the behaviour we seek to understand. This is a long-standing chestnut 
of all social sciences and it is particularly piquant in legal theory (or 
perhaps, legal philosophy) because legal theory invites and even demands 
normative analysis. Very quickly the business and corporate legal 
academy pronounced that the SCC had “got it right”, saved Canadian 
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Whether they did or not, this (intellectual) tension is currently unfolding 
with full force in the rescue of contract from contract law by observing its 
“death” on one hand33 and the celebration of contract as the new mode of 
transnational governance on the other.34 Contract theory makes invisible 
the constituted nature of arrangements based on contractual rights35 while 
at the same time we see renewed or at least extended interest in contractual 
conceptualization of legal relations.  
 
This renewed interest is at least in part as a result of the conditions of 
globalization and consequent de-territorialization of the corporate form we 
discussed in the introduction to this comment. Under these conditions and 
in the absence of a supra-national or “top-down” re-territorialization of 
corporate entities and more specifically, direct regulation of them, the 
focus of analysis becomes the bi-lateral contract. Relations within the 
administrative state (the contracting state?36) are being reconceptualized 
this way, as are transnational commercial relations (the lex mercatoria) 
and creditor relations.37 Even venerable state grants of monopoly rights are 
being challenged by movements to individually negotiate and control the 
extension of intangible property – copyright38 – outside commercial or for-
profit practices. (Note too, the tendency or perhaps requirement to 
standardize contractual terms and relations in this development).  
 
                                                 
33 Schwartz, A. & R. E. Scott, "Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law'" (2003) 
113 Yale L. J. 541-619; Scott, R.E. "The Death of Contract Law", (2004) 54 UTLJ 369-
390. 
34 Teubner, G., "Breaking Frames: Economic Globalisation and the Emergence of Lex 
Mercatoria" . Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=893143. 
35 Zumbansen, P. “The Law of Society: Governance Through Contract” CLPE Research 
Paper 2/2007 available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=988610; Kreitner, R., "Fear of 
Contract" (2004) Wisconsin Law Review, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=632262. 
36 Freeman, J., “The Contracting State”, (2001) 28 Florida State University Law Review 
155. 
37 Tung, F., “The New Death of Contract: Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties for 
Creditors” Emory Law and Economics Research Paper No. 07-24 Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1125364. 
38 Lessig, L, Free Culture (New York: Penguin, 2004) and, of course, freely available 
online under a Creative Commons license; Benkler, Y., The Wealth of Networks (New 
Haven: Yale UP, 2007). 




VI. THE BONDHOLDERS CONTRACTING 
PREDICAMENT 
 
We have described a problematic of legal or any social science, the tension 
between the idealization of the subject in analysis and the context which it 
seeks to understand: put another way, we have described how the contract 
is a formal reduction of the circumstances in which it is created which 
does not capture the wider differentiated natures of parties, circumstances 
and changing conditions. We understand why, as a matter of legal science, 
we could construct a systematic analysis of contractual relations this way, 
and some of the frailties associated with it. 
 
The case of the debentureholders is interesting in this light. The core 
argument of the appellants before the SCC is that they negotiated the 
terms of the bonds they bought, or if they didn’t, they should have. They 
should not be accorded any broader consideration by the board of BCE. If 
they did not negotiate protections against the addition of LBO-level debt 
— so the argument goes — they paid a discount as a result. They took a 
risk, and the cost of that risk now falls on them. It should fall on them, 
because they intended it to.  
 
We could and probably should consider institutional bondholders as 
capable and sophisticated counter-parties with a realistic option not to 
enter the transaction, and real power to affect the terms of the deal, 
although the recent history of asset-backed commercial paper leads us to 
wonder whether this sophistication is over-emphasized in some 
transactions. This characterization implies that the bondholders should 
have and probably did acknowledge the possibility of an LBO “event”. 
We also know that covenants restricting new debt or triggering repayment 
rights in certain events are common devices, and so, contract theory 
predicts, there must have been other reasons not to include them. Professor 
MacIntosh suggests that one is price: that the bondholders “virtually 
certainly” received a discount for not including such conventional 
protections in the contracts. A rough guide to the cost of including those 
covenants could be bondholders’ losses in the event: for argument’s sake, 
10% to 20% of their value on the market. Some careful research might 
bear out this discount, we cannot say with certainty. What this price 
suggests is interesting for contract theory: the cost of adequate protection 
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is very high, perhaps even prohibitively expensive. There is at least one 
study39 of bondholder protections that tends to confirm this view: while 
covenants work pretty well and reflect risks, especially with established 
issuers, the exception was leveraged buy-outs. However,  
 
exhaustive contracts providing something approaching complete protection 
against agency costs prove feasible only in relational contexts conducive to 
ongoing renegotiation over time due to small numbers of lenders operating 
under reputational constraints…[t]his leaves bondholders confronting a 
residuum of agency costs and relying on secondary protections like monitoring, 
exit, diversification, and hedging [emphasis added].40 
 
Under these conditions, we assume bondholders decided to take a risk – 
the appellants urged this theory by arguing that the buyers were 
“repeatedly warned” that the debentures lacked adequate protections 
against LBOs, and they took a gamble that BCE would not add $30B in 
debt and see the ratings of their existing obligations downgraded. Yet, they 
would have had very good reason to make that bet, because management 
stated consistently that they would maintain investment grade ratings on 
its debt, and presumably bondholders continued to contemplate secondary 
protections, like exit. In fact, management went so far as to say that they 
would maintain investment grade ratings on BCE debt because they based 
their “relationships with bondholders on ‘fairness’ not literal interpretation 
of contracts; and that stakeholder interests would be balanced”.41  
 
Contract theory would ignore management’s comments about its 
commitment to fairness in shaping its financial architecture: that is so 
much puffery to a contractual view of the corporation. This contractual 
concept freezes the subjective will of the parties in a single moment of, 
literally, the issue, while the contractual reality and thus the contract’s 
scope and content evolve over time. In this case, a material change 
occurred over a very short time: management was approached by private 
equity investors in February, 2007; rejected the proposal; issued a 
statement on March 29 to that effect; was put “in play” on April 9 and 
                                                 
39 Bratton, W.W., "Bond Covenants and Creditor Protection: Economics and Law, 
Theory and Practice, Substance and Process" European Business Organization Law 
Review (EBOR), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=902910. 
40 Ibid. 
41 As quoted in the QCA judgment. 




management reversed its decision by April 20th. That three months is a 
long time in the financial world, and may have been enough time for 
institutional holders to exit, hedge or diversify their risk, but those changes 
would occur 10 or 20 years distant from the point of issue. 
 
Management’s sentiments change, interest rates change, strategies do not 
work out as planned, stock prices move up, or down. Relational contract 
theory offers valuable lessons in this regard:42 no contracting party, not 
even a sophisticated one, can negotiate and plan and for all arising 
eventualities with regard to the contractual arrangement’s development 
over time. This, of course, includes the complex consequences of takeover 
transactions, the economic merits of which – among others – remain 
anything but uncontested. In fact, numerous studies provide ample 
evidence that the economic outcomes of takeovers are often different than 
what either shareholders or management anticipated.43 This, in turn, 
suggests that the contract paradigm, rooted in the will theory, does little to 
explain the complexity of the full dimensions of contractual arrangements 
embedded in complex socio-economic situations such as the BCE 
transaction.  
 
If we discount any real descriptive or explanatory power from this 
contractualist view, especially as they move over time, its normative 
content and effect becomes more apparent. Contract theory — in effect, 
caveat emptor — is not so much a declaration of freedom to contract as an 
a priori choice of distributive mechanism in the event things go wrong, as 
we know from experience they inevitably will. We can begin to see the 
pressure that the contract theory puts on the capacity of the parties to 
negotiate risks and on the fairness of those negotiations in light of 
radically changed circumstances.  
 
How has that choice played itself out in the BCE decision? In the zero-
sum, binary contractual view, losses fall on the creditors. Bondholders saw 
the market value of their bonds fall by (say) 10% or 20%, although they 
                                                 
42 Campbell, D. "The Incompleteness of our Understanding of the Law and Economics of 
Relational Contract" (2004) Wisc. L. Rev. 645-678. 
43 Romano, R. "A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation" in K. J. Hopt 
and E. Wymeersch (eds.), European Takeovers. Law and Practice (Butterworths, 1992); 
Deakin S. & G. Slinger, "Hostile Takeovers, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm" 
(1997) 24 Journal of Law and Society 124-151. 
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will still get their coupons and principal — unless something unexpected 
happens, which is why they are now rated at higher risk than prior to the 
transaction. The insiders get a change of control fee, the service providers 
get transaction fees, and those “owners” lucky enough to buy stock on the 
secondary market before, say, February, 2007 see a decent 40% capital 
gain.  
 
In a wider view, the debt used to finance the deal has secondary effects 
which are difficult to estimate with any confidence, and, we think, difficult 
to contract around easily or efficiently. The rising price of borrowed 
money will see more internal corporate resources devoted to debt 
payments, leaving less for other tasks, such as product innovation or, say, 
the hiring and retention of new talent. It has already eliminated one 
dividend payment. Should shareholder, creditor and other counter-parties 
have bought protection? If the exit strategy is a short-term sale to 
international purchaser, and the future sale price is closely proximate to 
the transaction price (all this is very speculative), then the effect of this re-
distribution will be to have shifted economic benefit from existing 
bondholders to selling shareholders and throw some risk onto future 
stakeholders in the firm. Those same stakeholders may be farther removed 
form the locus of decision-making, and domestic bondholders will have a 
new set of relational requirements with which to cope in the management 
of their long-term contracts. Indeed, a French private equity firm, Axa 
Private Equity, has recently proposed that a “code of conduct” be used to 
guide the allocation of revenues from these transactions.44 (The issue for 
those transactions was the massive payouts made to current management). 
 
Not all of these concerns are or should be the concern of contract law — 
even corporate law — but those are the pressures “pushing in” on the 
corporate structure through these transactions and their effects. Those 
kinds of considerations are behind periodic declarations that “relationships 
with bondholders [are based] on ‘fairness’ not literal interpretation of 
contracts; and that stakeholder interests [will] be balanced”. 
 
                                                 
44 See Arnold, M. “Private equity chief calls for code on profits” Financial Times, July 
14, 2008 available online at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/64f9dae2-5113-11dd-b751-
000077b07658.html?dlbk&nclick_check=1 (last visited July 14, 2008). 




VII. THE EX-POST-FACTO DECISION-MAKER’S 
PREDICAMENT 
 
We return to the decision: the bondholders negotiated a discount against 
the value of removing debt protections from the debentures: end of story. 
 
The alternative and – it is said – more tragic ending is that courts step in to 
substitute their contextual and ex-post-facto interpretation of events. 
Tragic because courts are notoriously responsive to victims, make 
inconsistent judgments, fail to comprehend the implications of their 
decisions and are not in a position to cope with the effects of one-off 
decisions. The tragedy of judicial decision-making is sometimes amplified 
to suggest that it is a return to welfare-state paternalism (as MacIntosh 
warns darkly, those “Charter-minded judges”) and the end of innovative 
capitalism itself.  
 
We believe that that line of speculation has very interesting analytical 
possibilities, insofar as placing in stark relief how the retreat of an 
administrative state can shift attention away from the merits of an issue 
and onto the personalities of the courts. But welfare state paternalism is 
not en vogue45 state policy today and not what is at issue here. On the 
whole courts do not and should not substitute for business decisions: here 
we are ad idem with MacIntosh, and we note the development of the 
business judgment rule as one of several techniques for limiting 
inappropriate intervention when someone is handed a loss. 
 
No doubt many judicial decision-makers feel the same way: there are good 
reasons why the SCC has not, to date, ventured much into corporate 
constitutional questions. These decision-makers are, moreover, put in a 
difficult position by the contractual theory of the corporation: bondholders 
are perhaps not bleeding victims but from time to time courts face 
plaintiffs in real hardship, they are urged to ignore the post-contractual 
context of the relationship and interpret documents with concepts 
                                                 
45 Zumbansen, P. "Law after the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic 
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developed in another age. They have little ability to manage the outcomes 
of their decisions, unlike the contracting parties. 
 
Another view, though, is that where intervention is proper or required, 
contracts, or at least those very special “contracts” that form the 
relationships of a corporation, need to be managed and interpreted because 
they form large institutions in our economy. In this light, we might ask 
that what courts do is not to be paternal to the parties by substituting its 
own wisdom, but make — as do the parties involved most of the time — 
bargains on the future. 
 
We see similar and related reconceptualizations46 in corporate theory in 
the analysis of “extra-legal” or informal norms in the balancing of 
stakeholder interests, and in corporate governance practices in the 
adoption of several layers of codes of conduct that surround and inform 
the more formal and legally rigid structure of the corporation. We see a 
similar reconceptualization in securities law. Where once it focused more 
on disclosure at the time of issue — a point-in-time regulation of rights 
and obligations by statute — we now see some more attention paid to 
appropriate continuous disclosure, and management of the consequences 
accordingly. In this respect, corporate statutes themselves become eclipsed 
by the world of securities regulation, which makes sense if we view most 
security-holders claims as bundles of rights to streams of revenues, and 
not as residual property owners. 
 
VIII. FROM SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY TO A 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
 
These developments are sometimes contentious, but they point to the 
“sources” of law and one way in which wider interests in the corporation 
can be articulated if not imposed.  
 
                                                 
46 Blair, M. M. & Stout, L.A.., "A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law" (1999) 
85:2 Virginia Law Review 248-328 available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=425500 or 
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.425500. 




In the narrow confines of the BCE decision, the analysis can be reduced to 
a zero-sum tradeoff between fixed and residual claimants. It is tempting to 
do so. That description has conceptual clarity and formal symmetry, which 
is appealing to a decision-maker and to a theorist: it might even be fair in 
this case. Bondholders are often not the most sympathetic plaintiffs — 
even if they represent someone’s retirement savings held in mutual or 
pension funds — and we are not suggesting that they have some particular 
privilege or special infirmity. They might: we do not speculate.  
 
But from the perspective of a social choice — and we do contend that 
freedom of contract and the CBCA are social choices over which we can 
make policy — the purely contractual view of these relations often comes 
at the cost of a better understanding of the factors influencing that 
particular contractual relationship, and excludes a wider range of ways to 
cope with vagaries arising within them. The parties investing in any 
company will make bargains on the firm’s development, which will unfold 
within a framework that cannot alone be described by what parties wrote 
into their contracts. Whenever decision-making is required, at the point of 
investment, at some re-negotiation of terms, at a fundamental transaction 
of the firm, at a regulatory intervention, or in disputes brought before 
courts, such contracts should be examined with caution. But where action 
must be taken, good decisions will be informed by consideration of the 
stakeholders’ interests, sometimes notwithstanding the terms of their 
debentures or employment contracts or restrictions on shares. This is a 
practical imperative and goes well beyond shareholder primacy (although 
it limits it), or calls for the SCC to re-interpret Wise in keeping with the 
takeover line of case law, or suggestions that the Court should explicitly 
import the Revlon rule from U.S. jurisprudence. It is an emerging reality 
of modern global corporate life. 
 
As the corporate governance debate continues to transnationalize,47 the 
assessment of corporate law’s ‘anatomy48’ is being transformed from a 
                                                 
47 The reference to ‘foreign’ materials, even in domestically oriented corporate law 
scholarship, has become second nature: see a powerful, recent illustration out of 
Germany, reviewing case law and scholarship on directors’ duties from six jurisdictions: 
Lars Klöhn, ‘Interessenkonflikte zwischen Aktionären und Gläubigern der 
Aktiengesellschaft im Spiegel der Vorstandspflichten’, (2008) ZGR Zeitschrift für das 
gesamte Unternehmensrecht 110-158. 
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traditional domestic and comparative perspective into a multi-faceted, 
interdisciplinary inquiry into the regulatory conditions of modern-day 
corporations. These conditions can no longer be captured with reference 
alone to path-dependent law and policy-making trajectories in a given 
jurisdiction.49 Instead, corporate governance has become a polycontextual 
regulatory field marked by a complementarity of different norm-
entrepreneurs in and outside of the nation-state, altogether contributing to 
an extremely layered and textured body of norm shaping corporate 
behavior. The evolving nature of corporate governance as ‘transnational 
legal pluralism’50 presents just as many challenges to the traditional 
analytical framework to study corporate law as it presents opportunities 
for a more effective inquiry into the dynamics of change in this regulatory 
regime. 
 
                                                                                                                         
48 Kraakman, R. et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional 
Approach (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
49 See only Roe, M. 'Comparative corporate governance', in P. Newman (eds.), The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), and the 
contributions to Gordon J.N. & M. J. Roe (eds.), Convergence and Persistence in 
Corporate Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
50 Zumbansen, P."'New Governance' in European Corporate Law Regulation as 
Transnational Legal Pluralism" (April 2008). CLPE Research Paper No. 15/2008 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1128145. 
